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Abstract 
While existing research on the topic is sparse, previous works have shown that there is 
believed to be a substantial threat of intentional, malicious contamination of the supply chain by 
criminals and terrorists (CFSAN, 2001; WHO, 2008). Genuine contamination incidents have the 
potential to result in mass casualties, although empty threats are often enough to generate public 
fear and lead to considerable economic damage. While empty threats often appear indistinguishable 
from those which will result in contamination, it is thought that certain variables identified in 
perpetrator communications may be able to help separate empty threats from those which will be 
actualized. This research thus attempts to determine whether a perpetrator’s reported choice of 
agent could offer functional predictions for the likelihood of actual contamination in future 
incidents. Findings indicate that chemical agents alone are more likely to be associated with genuine 
contamination, while the claimed use of biological agents alone as well as chemical, biological and 
radionuclear (CBRN) agents combined are more often associated with empty threats. The utility of 
these findings will be discussed, as well as suggestions for future research.  
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Introduction 
Over the past 20 years, a number of studies have identified the potential severity of 
outcomes in cases of product contamination, and for food and water contamination in 
particular (e.g., Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition [CFSAN], 2001; Sobel, Khan & 
Swerdlow, 2002; World Health Organization [WHO], 2008), with the probability of a 
malicious contamination event with at least 5,000 casualties estimated at between 10% and 
30% in a given year, and thought to be increasing each year (Mohtadi & Murshid, 2009). Due 
to the diversity of products which can be targeted through contamination, as well as the 
globalization of the market, food is considered to be one of the most susceptible means 
available for those who wish to harm a great number of individuals (WHO, 2008) as this 
method of transmission has an effect on the entire population (Stinson, Kinsey, Degeneffe, & 
Ghosh, 2007).  
In the event of a food terrorism incident, a widespread operation would not be 
necessary, as targeting only a few specific products or individuals would still likely result in 
the desired consequence of mass public fear and anxiety (WHO, 2008) as well as have 
substantial economic implications (Khan, Swerdlow, & Juranek, 2001). In addition, for 
attacks using chemical and biological weapons, the resulting publicity for those responsible 
or for their cause could be considered a “very compelling incentive” for terrorist 
organizations (Cornish, 2007, p.7). According to the WHO (2008), the effects of food 
terrorism can include impacts on public health services, the economy and trade, social and 
political implications, as well as disease and death. Additionally, an attack against the food 
supply of the US, or any other industrialized nation, could also distract the military from 
other potential threats (CFSAN, 2001), and public anxiety could also reduce trust in 
government, thus having a ripple effect on political stability (WHO, 2008). Finally, the 
psychological effects on the public can be severe in attacks involving chemical, biological, 
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and radionuclear agents, as following the 1995 sarin gas attacks in the Tokyo subway, more than 
5000 individuals were found to have physical symptoms without any exposure to the sarin gas 
(Lemyre et al., 2005).  
However, physical harm to consumers as a result of actual product contamination may not 
always be required – or even desired – to attain terrorist or criminal goals. In many instances threats 
and hoaxes involving the contamination of consumer products can be seen to achieve desired 
outcomes, with common motives including financial gain by conning the targeted company or the 
desire for personal or political attention (Logan, 1993). Additionally, extortion attempts do not 
necessarily require actual contamination to have taken place, but only a threat substantial enough to 
make consumers, and thus the victimized company, take notice (Cremin, 2001). Therefore, 
depending on the final goal of the individual or organization, the decision to use an empty threat 
may be a more rational choice than the actual contamination of a product, as the same outcome can 
be achieved with seemingly no technical skill, knowledge of or access to any contaminating agents. 
Indeed, it has been suggested that even the implication that chemical or biological agents have been 
used against the food supply could create havoc (Mohtadi & Murshid, 2009).  
While physical harm is no longer a concern in cases of empty threats, affected companies 
may deal with a number of financial issues including the loss of consumer confidence and long-term 
damage to the brand (Cremin, 2001; Dalziel, 2009), as well as the cost of a recall if the threat is 
assumed to be a case of genuine contamination (Morgan, 1988). Indeed, when considering potable 
water sources as an example, even a threat of contamination could lead to as serious an incident as 
a genuine terrorist attack (Gleick, 2006). One particular contamination hoax involving the claimed 
adulteration of Mars Bars by animal rights activists in 1984 cost roughly £6 million for the company 
(Monaghan, 2000). Beyond economics and as with actual contamination incidents, empty threats 
using consumer products can cause widespread public fear, and may even lead to changes in 
consumer purchasing behavior (e.g., Mitchell, 1989; Yeung & Morris, 2001).    
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Therefore, both actual contamination incidents and empty threats present 
considerable challenges to law enforcement and targeted companies. Ideally, whether or 
not a product has been (or will be) genuinely contaminated should determine the response 
in such cases, as the ultimate outcome will dictate, for instance, whether a costly product 
recall should be issued. However, it is often the case that terrorist threats will need to be 
considered as legitimate precursors to action until proven otherwise, due to the potential 
high cost of incorrectly treating a genuine attack as innocuous (Tishler, 2016). The same can 
be said to be true for criminal attacks against the supply chain. This strategy, however, is not 
without its own risks. Of note here is the Chilean grape scare of 1989, in which grapes 
imported to the US and other countries were thought to be contaminated with cyanide. 
After initial tests showing small traces of cyanide, the US banned these grapes, with Chile 
reportedly losing $330 million as a result (Dalziel, 2009). However, further tests revealed no 
conclusive evidence of cyanide contamination, and so this case offers a clear example of 
how the economic damage from a case wrongly assessed as a genuine risk could be just as, if 
not more damaging than, an actual attack (Dalziel, 2009). 
It is then crucial to be able to identify which cases are likely to result in genuine 
physical contamination, and which cases are likely to remain empty threats. As one of the 
requirements of such a threats is the need for attention (because the threat will not serve its 
function if no one is watching), and as the perpetrators of genuine contamination incidents 
will often benefit from public knowledge of their crime as well, it is important to consider 
what information can be taken from communications which are claimed to come from the 
perpetrator during such incidents.  
Assessing Threats  
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As mentioned previously, there are many instances in which a perpetrator engaging in 
product contamination may make the choice to use an empty threat, and differentiating between 
cases that will progress to violence from those that will not is incredibly difficult. One method which 
may help in differentiating between an individual thinking about an action from someone actually 
intending on carrying out that behavior is to examine perpetrator implementation intentions. 
Implementation intentions offer specific detail on the when, where, and how someone will meet 
their intended goals (Sooniste, Granhag, Stromwall, & Vrij, 2014). As implementation intentions go 
beyond what a person wants to achieve and instead focuses on the behaviors needed to reach their 
goal, an individual who does not actually intend to follow through with an action will be unlikely to 
give appropriate detail on how the act would be carried out, thus failing to form true 
implementation intention (Sheeran, Milne, Webb, & Gollwitzer, 2005). Sooniste and colleagues 
(2014) found that participants telling the truth about an innocuous task were more concerned with 
explaining procedural details (i.e., the how of the act) in comparison to participants covering up 
ulterior criminal intentions (‘liars’), who were more concerned about the reasoning behind the task 
(i.e., the why of the act). This may be due to the preoccupation on the part of the liars with 
convincing the target about their desire and intent to follow through with their stated actions 
(Sooniste et al., 2014). 
Applying this research to contamination incidents, it is believed that those offering threats 
that will not progress to violence would provide communication lacking in methodological detail due 
to the fact that they do not actually intend to carry out the stated action. This could extend to a 
number of key pieces of information pertaining to how the act would be carried out, possibly 
including the location, the method of contamination, and the contaminating agent itself. This is not 
to say that threateners would not form implementation intentions at all, but rather that statements 
would be focused on covering up their lies rather than how the stated act would be carried out 
(Sooniste et al., 2014). However, it is worth emphasizing here that the ‘truth-tellers’ in the Sooniste 
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et al. (2014) study engaged in a non-criminal activity, which differs from the current study in 
which all individuals have taken part in some malicious act, even if just issuing an empty 
threat (Geurts, Granhag, Ask, & Vrij, 2016).  
Following on from the previous work, Geurts and colleagues conducted an 
experiment involving the issuing of threats against a fictitious company. In their study the 
authors differentiate between actualizers, being defined as providing “a stated intention to 
cause harm that the threatener genuinely intends to carry out”, and bluffers, who offer “a 
stated intention to cause harm that the threatener does not intend to carry out” (2016, 
p.53). In contrast to previous findings about implementation intentions, Geurts et al. (2016) 
found that bluffers tended to provide more details than actualizers when it came to the how 
of the act. In addition, bluffers revealed more how information when challenged about their 
threat, perhaps due to concern that their threat was not being taken seriously (Geurts et al., 
2016). What may be crucial with these results is not what is possible for the perpetrator to 
say, but what is best for them to say, indicating that careful calculation may be used when 
delivering threats (Geurts et al., 2016). If this were to be true for those engaging in 
contamination threats, it would be expected that perpetrators might offer more how detail 
in an attempt to make their threat more believable. While the Geurts et al. (2016) study may 
offer a closer approximation to contamination cases as all participants issued threats with 
the potential to be criminal given the circumstances, it is not clear whether an experimental 
study using a student sample can be fully generalized to the current sample of actual crimes.  
A threatening communication which is sent by the perpetrator claiming past or 
future product contamination may contain both why and how information. As questions 
have been raised from previous research of whether detailed how information is more likely 
to be indicative of bluffers or ‘truth-tellers’, this information will be given primary attention. 
In particular, the agent chosen by the perpetrator (i.e., their weapon) will be the focus of the 
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current analysis, as this piece of how information is frequently reported in the media and other 
available sources on contamination threats, and may tell a great deal about the perpetrator (e.g., 
their potential access to such agents) as well as their desired outcome. According to Jackson and 
Frelinger (2008, p.2), a perpetrator’s weapon of choice implies “the scale and scope of their 
violence”, and weapon choice has also been identified as important in understanding a perpetrator’s 
apparent intended lethality (Wilson & Lemanski, 2013). In regard to chemical, biological and 
radiological weapons, the type of agent chosen may be indicative of factors such as the size of the 
chemical or biological industry in the country of attack or the perpetrator’s religious ideology, 
although there may also be differences based on whether these incidents are empty threats or 
actual attacks (Tishler, 2013). Indeed, previous research on product contamination has revealed that 
different agents may be used in threats and authentic attacks, as those agents which are easiest to 
obtain, such as household poisons (Dalziel, 2009) and foreign objects (Graves, Smith & Batchelor, 
1998), are most frequently used in attacks on the food supply, while more concerning and difficult to 
obtain biological agents may be more likely to be used in threats alone (Wilson & Kilbane, 2017). 
Additionally, it has been noted that the unease around biological agents could mean that they are 
important tools to use during threats (Cornish, 2007). However, before proceeding it is first 
necessary to determine how these particularly dangerous agents may be classified as such. 
Identifying Agents of Concern  
 During contamination incidents there are typically four general categories of agent used; 
biological agents (e.g., bacteria, toxins, viruses and parasites), chemical agents (e.g., pesticides and 
heavy metals), radiological agents (e.g., polonium), and physical agents (e.g., glass, pieces of metal) 
(CFSAN, 2001). Agents that are easily dispersed, are very likely to cause serious illness or death, and 
require vigilance from public health organizations are often identified as being the most concerning, 
and include botulism and anthrax toxins (Sobel et al., 2002). However, the list of particularly 
concerning agents can be quite long depending on the source of this information, and even easily 
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obtained chemicals such as lead, mercury, and pesticides have been identified by the US Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as agents which could be used by terrorists to attack the food 
supply (CFSAN, 2003). It is thus initially quite difficult to decide which agents should be given the 
most serious attention without additional details concerning the target chosen, the mode of 
transmission, and other situational variables.  
However, if empty threats are to capitalize on public fear, as would certainly be the 
case with food and water terrorism, then it is not only the attitudes of public health officials 
and law enforcement which are important, but also which agents may be perceived as 
concerning to the general public. Such agents that have the greatest capacity to induce fear 
may fall under the category of CBRN, or ‘chemical, biological, and radionuclear’ agents. This 
term is most often used in the context of CBRN terrorism, with these likely to be the agents 
used should there be an attack on the food supply chain (Mohtadi & Murshid, 2009). Despite 
the fact that very few deaths have resulted from CBRN terrorism in the past (Ivanova & 
Sandler, 2007), several authors have noted the public fear which is likely to accompany the 
use of such agents. For instance, Cornish (2007, p.3) notes that if a CBRN attack was to take 
place in the UK, the effects could be partly ‘self-inflicted’ by the public, business and 
government officials, or even made worse by the media due to the panic that the use of 
such agents may foster. Indeed, CBRN agents have been described as “weapons of terror”, 
the use of which would be likely to result in anxiety on both an individual and communal 
level, caused by the uncertainty concerning the given agent’s effects on the population 
(Palmer, 2004, p.3).  
Despite the fact that CBRN attacks have been a regular topic of discussion in recent 
years, it is still difficult to identify a clear and accessible definition for this term. The need for 
such a clear definition is also echoed by Plamboeck et al., who note that a vast number of 
substances can be classified as CBRN (2016). For Plamboeck and colleagues, in the case of 
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chemicals this should exclude drugs, explosives and household chemicals, but does include chemical 
warfare agents (CWA) and toxic industrial chemicals (TIC). Therefore, and despite what its acronym 
implies, not all chemicals would be considered as CBRN agents. Additionally, many agents, and 
especially those which are radiological or chemical such as ammonia, chlorine, sulfur or 
formaldehyde, may have multiple legitimate uses in certain industries (Cornish, 2007), and so 
scenarios exist in which specific CBRN agents from each of these categories may be obtained 
relatively easily.  
Cornish (2007) offers even more detail on what agents may be considered CBRN by outlining 
a number of different chemical weapon categories (i.e., nerve agents, blood agents, blister agents, 
choking agents, vomiting agents, incapacitants and irritants) as well as the three category system (A, 
B and C) used by the US CDC to identify biological weapons. In these three categories those of 
greatest concern fall within Category A, those which are expected to result in fewer illnesses and 
deaths are in Category B, and those which are not thought to present a high risk are in Category C 
(Rotz, Khan, Lillibridge, Ostroff, & Hughes, 2002). While such classifications do make it easier to 
identify agents of particular concern, the CDC’s Category B includes as bioterrorism agents ‘food-
borne agents’, which is again a relatively indistinct category, making it difficult to identify those 
biological threats to food which are of the greatest concern to public health, and to differentiate 
between intentional and unintentional contamination. Cornish (2007) also identifies that uranium-
235 and plutonium-239 are of the highest concern when it comes to radiological agents, although 
other radiological agents which may be used in terrorist incidents are mentioned by the author as 
well. While there is no definitive list of what constitutes a CBRN agent, the agents mentioned in 
Cornish (2007) offer a good starting point to work from.  
 As can be seen, the term ‘CBRN’ has often been defined in vague terms, but has generally 
been used as a stand-in for concerning and dangerous contaminating agents. For this paper then, a 
specific definition of ‘CBRN’ agents is proposed in an attempt to identify those agents in this sample 
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likely to both (a) cause the most fear among would-be targets and victims, and (b) have the potential 
for causing a great deal of physical harm. In order to identify particularly concerning chemical 
agents, Schedules 1, 2 and 3 of toxic chemicals and their precursors from the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is used. The CWC 
Schedules have been consulted due to a lack of specific chemical components listed in Cornish 
(2007). However, as with Cornish (2007), the ‘biological’ component can be fulfilled by any agent 
considered to be a bioterrorism agent by the US CDC. Finally, an item is considered to be in the 
‘radionuclear’ category if it is a radioactive element. Thus ‘CBRN’ is used here as an exclusionary 
category, containing only specific and particularly threatening chemical, biological, and radionuclear 
substances. However, more comprehensive agent categories will also be considered in the current 
analysis, including all chemical agents, all biological agents, all radiological agents, all foreign bodies, 
and the claimed use of ‘poison’ alone. 
Research Aims 
When a threat is received by the authorities, the media, or a victimized company, 
the recipient of such threats must have a plan in place in order to effectively respond. As 
stated by Geurts et al. (2016), it is vitally important to differentiate between those who plan 
to carry out their threats (i.e., actualizers) as opposed to those who offer threats but do not 
plan to carry them out (i.e., bluffers). While it is expected that the amount of detail a 
perpetrator supplies in regards to their agent of choice will (at least in part) indicate their 
true intention, it is not clear whether this will be consistent with the work of Sooniste et al. 
(2014) with less practical (how) detail being provided by threateners, or the work of Geurts 
et al. (2016) where bluffers offerred more such detail. However, it is believed that being able 
to name a specific contaminating agent could suggest existing knowledge on the part of the 
perpetrator, and thus the ability to follow through with the threat. As a result, in considering 
the agent reportedly named by the perpetrator, it is expected that: 
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H1 – Specifically named agents will be more strongly associated with actual contamination than 
cases involving vague threats of ‘poison’     
In addition, this work will also assess whether certain agent categories are more likely to be 
associated with actual contamination rather than empty threats alone, as well as the likelihood of 
encountering a genuine act of malicious contamination when a CBRN agent is claimed to have been 
used. Based on previous research it is expected that the most concerning agents, including 
biological, radionuclear and CBRN agents, will more often be associated with empty threats as 
opposed to actual contaminations, leading to the following hypothesis: 
H2 – Particularly concerning agents, including biological, radiological and CBRN agents, will 
be more strongly associated with empty threats than chemical agents, foreign bodies and 
non-CBRN agents.    
 
Method 
The Sample  
The sample for this study consisted of all known malicious contamination incidents occurring 
worldwide from 1970 to 2011 in which there was some form of communication made on behalf of 
the perpetrator (n=77). This sample was taken from a larger dataset of malicious contamination 
incidents (n=384), composed of intentional poisonings, product tamperings, and incidents which fell 
in between these two categories. Poisonings and product tamperings can be said to exist on either 
end of a spectrum and have been fully defined elsewhere (Wilson & Kilbane, 2017), although 
poisonings are generally seen as being carried out by someone known to the victim, with the 
contamination occurring in the home with an open consumable, while product tamperings may 
involve a commercial target and unspecified victims, with a packaged consumable being 
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contaminated. While perpetrator communication itself is identified as a variable typically 
indicative of product tampering (Wilson & Kilbane, 2017), and incidents of product 
tampering were most numerous in this sample (n=69), there were also several cases of 
poisoning (n=7) and one intermediate case in this sample as well. Both poisoning and 
product tampering cases were included here as these acts are thought to occur on a 
continuum, and so considering such acts together provides a more complete understanding 
of the full spectrum of malicious contamination incidents.  
A malicious contamination incident was considered to be a plot, threat, or an actual 
case of a consumer product or other consumable item being knowingly and intentionally 
contaminated. The contamination could occur at any point along the production chain and 
could involve any consumer product. However, cases believed to be accidental 
contaminations or contamination as a result of corporate negligence were not included in 
the sample. Sexual assault cases in which the victim was first drugged were also excluded as 
they were not captured by the search criteria and were thought to cover a different type of 
phenomenon. In addition, each of the 77 incidents in this sample could be considered as 
either a single attack on a specific individual or individuals using a consumer product, or a 
campaign of multiple attacks or threats on a consumer product being carried out using the 
same method and a common motive. Here campaigns were coded as single incidents due to 
the difficulty in separating out individual communications during the reporting of such cases. 
While this cross-sectional examination does not allow for the progression of threats to 
violence to be examined, it does make it possible to observe the association between 
communication-related variables and eventual contamination outcomes (i.e., whether or 
not a product will actually be contaminated).  
Using the inclusion criteria for each case described above, malicious contamination 
incidents were identified from existing databases (Carus, 2002; Dalziel, 2009) and through 
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online newspaper searches. International, national and regional newspapers were searched using 
LexisNexis, ProQuest and ProQuest Historical, as well as Google and Google News search engines, 
and the US FDA’s criminal investigation press releases. General search terms included ‘product 
tampering’, ‘tamper’, ‘tampering’, ‘poison’, ‘poisoning’, ‘contamination’, and ‘contaminate’, as well 
as the names of the perpetrators and victims when this information was known.  
Once all known contamination incidents during the timeframe were compiled, a number of 
behavioral variables were coded as being either present or absent in each case, with news reports, 
academic journal articles, and government publications as described above being the sources of 
qualitative case data. For the current analysis, each incident was coded based on whether the 
chosen product was found to be contaminated or not (i.e., whether the case was an actual 
contamination or an empty threat), which agent was used or claimed to have been used (i.e., 
chemical, biological, radiological, foreign body, or ‘poison’), who was contacted (i.e., the authorities, 
the media, or the targeted company), which method of communication was used (i.e., phone, letter, 
or email), and whether any demands were made (i.e., monetary or otherwise). In addition, cases 
were categorized based on whether they lacked the potential to cause any harm (i.e., a hoax case), 
and whether any illnesses or deaths resulted from the incident. With the exception of the name of 
the agent used as reported in the source material, all variables were coded dichotomously (the 
behavior being absent or present). An interrater reliability analysis was conducted on 18% of the 
data (n=14) with a second independent researcher familiar with the topic. This analysis yielded a 
significant kappa value (ĸ=.822, p<.001) indicating strong consistency.   
While reducing descriptive, qualitative data into dichotomous data does have its 
shortcomings, this is a common technique in forensic psychology (e.g., Almond, Duggan, Shine, & 
Canter, 2005; Canter & Heritage, 1990; Donohue & Taylor, 2003; Dixon, Hamilton-Giachritsis, & 
Browne, 2008), and allows for statistical analyses to be conducted on the data. It must also be 
acknowledged that, unlike some past studies which have relied on direct communications (e.g., 
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Geurts et al., 2014; Sooniste et al., 2014), the data here reflect what was reported of 
perpetrator communications in the media rather than the content of the actual 
communications themselves. This was due to the inability to gain access to actual 
threatening communications in contamination cases. Indeed, access to primary sources of 
data in these cases has previously been identified as a significant problem (Cremin, 2001; 
Dalziel, 2009). While such open-source intelligence may be lacking in detail (Egan et al., 
2016), it makes for a necessary starting point when data from law enforcement or targeted 
companies is inaccessible, as is often the case with contamination cases.  
Bayes’ Theorem  
 In order to determine the likelihood of actual contamination taking place (as 
opposed to an empty or unactualized threat) when a specific threat is made, Bayes’ 
Theorem will be used. This method allows for probabilities of future likelihood to be 
determined based on past observations. Bayes’ Theorem can be defined as:  
Pr(𝐴|𝑋) =  
Pr(𝑋|𝐴) Pr (𝐴)
Pr (𝑋)
 
The equation is then solved for Pr(A|X), or the posterior probability, which in this specific case is the 
probability of an item being actually contaminated (A) given a chosen agent (henceforth denoted as 
‘Y’) is claimed to be used (X). The value of (X|A) is then the probability of an agent Y being used given 
the product in question has actually been contaminated, with Pr(A) and Pr(X) representing both the 
probability of a product actually being contaminated and the probability of an agent Y being used 
respectively. Once values have been identified for these variables the equation can be solved, with 
the value for Pr(A|X) then used to estimate the likelihood of an actual contamination occurring in 
the future given the claimed use of the selected variable. As little empirical research has been 
conducted in this area previously, the values for each of the variables on the right side of the 
equation will be based on the current dataset of contamination incidents. 
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Bayesian statistics may be used in the social sciences instead of traditional, frequentist null 
hypothesis testing, in part because the latter can be plagued by both false positives and false 
negatives. While Bayesian inference does not eliminate these errors, it relies on past information to 
obtain real-world probabilities. The use of Bayes’ Theorem then allows for new information to be 
incorporated into existing models, with prior probabilities being updated as more information 
becomes available. Bayesian techniques have been previously used in modeling terrorism risk (Ezell, 
Bennett, von Winterfeldt, Sokolowski, & Collins, 2010; Horowitz & Haimes, 2003), developing 
accurate criminal profiles in cases of single victim homicides (Baumgartner, Ferrari, & Palermo, 
2008), predicting recidivism for sexually violent offenders (Wollert, 2006) and crime linkage (de 
Zoete et al., 2014). In addition, Bayesian methods have also been recommended for use in risk 
prediction for forensic psychiatric patients (Duggan & Jones, 2017) and in Behavioural Investigative 
Advising (Allen, 2014).    
 
Results 
Communication and Agent Categories  
 In the 77 malicious contamination incidents in which communication was made by the 
perpetrator, the most common recipient was the targeted company (n=54; 70.1%), followed by the 
media (n=18; 23.4%) and the authorities (n=10; 13.0%), with 10 cases in which more than one type 
of recipient was contacted, and five where the recipient was not listed (see Table 1). Most 
commonly these communications were in the form of a posted letter (n=47; 61.0%) or a phone call 
(21; 27.3%), but communication was also made by email or some other online method (n=5; 6.5%). 
In 43 of the incidents (55.8%) the perpetrator demanded money, and in six additional cases (7.8%) 
there was some non-monetary demand made. One example of such a case involved an unknown 
perpetrator threatening to poison the products of an Australian biscuit maker unless a polygraph 
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test was administered to police officers involved in a 1991 murder conviction (“Biscuit maker drops 
stock”, 1997).  
Just over half of the cases in this sample (n=41; 53.2%) involved genuine 
contamination of the claimed product, with the perpetrator communication serving as an 
authentic warning or an actualized threat. While none of these actual contamination 
incidents resulted in any deaths, 19.5% (n=8) of such genuine contaminations led to at least 
one injury, and a further 51.2% (n=21) were potentially harmful in nature, with the 
remainder of cases (n=12; 29.3%) involving contamination with a harmless agent, such as 
dye or an agent which could not be transmitted to humans through the stated mechanism of 
delivery. One such example involved threats to introduce plutonium into the water supply of 
New York City unless charges were dropped against the ‘Subway Vigilante’ Bernhard Goetz 
(Weatherby, 1985). While a greater concentration of plutonium was found in a sample of 
the drinking water at the time, analysts could not determine at which point the water had 
been contaminated (Bogen et al., 1988). However, plutonium is unlikely to cause much 
damage when disseminated in a public water source as it will be diluted to harmless 
amounts (Durante & Manti, 2002), and so the potential for physical harm in this case was 
virtually non-existant. Such hoaxes are thus included here as they indicate that the 
perpetrator had the means and the ability to contaminate the product, even if no harm 
could result.  
 Of the information contained in such communications in addition to demands, this often 
included the chosen product or products, whether the item had been contaminated already or might 
be in the future, and the contaminating agent selected. As mentioned, the agents could be broadly 
split into categories of chemical agents (n=38; 49.4%), biological agents (n=19; 24.7%), radiological 
agents (n=1; 1.3%), or foreign bodies (n=8; 10.4%), although more than one agent could be used in a 
single communication, as occurred in five cases (see Table 1). In eight cases the specific agent was 
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either unspecified, unknown or unreported, and in 10 cases (13.0% of incidents) only a vague 
description was included using words like ‘poison’ or ‘contaminate’. In 89.6% of communications in 
this sample an agent was mentioned in the communication, even if only through use of a vague term 
as described above. Agent categories are considered here as it would be unmanageable to 
determine base rates for all 40 different agents claimed to have been used in the cases in this 
sample.    
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 As can be seen in Table 2, the likelihood of actual product contamination based on the agent 
mentioned in the perpetrator communication (Pr(A|X)) differs for each agent type. Again, Pr(A) 
represents the overall likelihood of actual contamination in the sample, Pr(X) the likelihood of such 
an agent being used in all cases, and Pr(X|A) the probability of such an agent being used given actual 
contamination occurring. From this information the equation can be solved for Pr(A|X), with this 
column showing the probability of an attack taking place given the agent identified has been 
mentioned by the perpetrator. Claimed uses of radiological agents, foreign bodies, and multiple 
different agents were associated with a high likelihood of genuine contamination (>80%), while the 
use of a vague phrase like ‘poison’ was only associated with less than a 10% chance of such an 
outcome. However, it is worth noting that only one case of a radiological agent being claimed to be 
used was identified in this sample, and as a result the probably would be likely to change if 
additional cases of radiological threats were incorporated.   
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
For the two most prevalent agent types, the probability of actual contamination was 76.1% 
for chemical agents compared to 26.3% for biological agents. However, as both the designations for 
‘biological agent’ and ‘chemical agent’ are relatively broad, describing agents with variable degrees 
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of harmfulness, a more specific designation is needed to fully understand the probability of 
threat actualization when the most concerning agents are selected.  
CBRN Agents and Contamination  
Here CBRN agents (as defined above) were considered those agents classified as 
chemical weapons, bioterrorism agents, or radiological elements. A complete list of the 
CBRN agents reported in this sample can be found in Table 3, along with the number of 
cases in which each agent was used or claimed to have been used. Only six incidents were 
identified as claiming the use of CBRN agents in this sample, with five of these involving 
bioterrorism agents, and the remaining incident involving radioactive plutonium. With the 
exception of ricin which is listed under Schedule 1 of the CWC, no other chemical weapons 
were used or were claimed to have been used in this sample.      
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
As previously mentioned and as can be seen with Pr(A) in Table 4, when 
communication is received during a malicious contamination incident there is just over a 
50% chance that the product identified will actually be contaminated, with the opposing 
probability of an empty threat represented by Pr(A’). However, the probability that a case 
will involve a CBRN agent – whether as a hoax or an actual contamination – is much lower, 
at 7.8%. Using Bayes’ Theorem, the likelihood of an item actually being contaminated when 
a CBRN threat is received is 33.4%, which is a reduction from the likelihood of actualization 
for all communication cases (Pr(A)). Therefore, when a perpetrator issues a contamination 
threat involving a CBRN agent, it is more likely that this is an empty threat.  
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Discussion 
AGENT SELECTION AND THREAT ACTUALIZATION 
 
 
20 
 
By examining malicious contamination cases in which communication was made by the 
perpetrator, the highest likelihood of actual contamination was found with the claimed use of 
radiological agents (98%), foreign bodies (88%) and chemical agents (76%), while the claimed use of 
biological agents indicated only a 26% chance of actual contamination. These results were found to 
lend support to the second hypothesis, with the exception of radiological agents, which were 
expected to be more strongly associated with empty threats than actual contamination. This may be 
due to the fact that very few radiological cases were found in this sample, with the potential for the 
inclusion of additional radiological cases to substantially change the predicted outcome. Therefore, 
the results provided by this paper for radiological agents should be used with caution until more 
data can be collected on such cases. As for chemical and biological agents, it may be that chemical 
agents, which can include easily accessible household poisons, such as pesticides and cleaning 
products, are selected due to both their availability and their potential to cause harm. Biological 
agents on the other hand are often more difficult to access and may also be more fear inducing, 
indicating that they could be more useful during empty threats as opposed to genuine attempts to 
harm consumers.  
For CBRN agents specifically a 33% likelihood of actual contamination was found. As 
mentioned, it may be that frightening yet difficult to obtain biological and CBRN agents are more 
likely to be used in threats than actual contamination incidents due to their ability to create a great 
deal of fear among the general public. This is consistent with the work of Carus (2002) in that while 
biological pathogens and toxins may be used quite frequently during threats, the perpetrators are 
rarely in possession of such agents. Cornish also reiterates this point when it comes to biological 
weapons (BW), stating “[i]n the terrorist’s mind, even the language or threat of a BW attack could 
offer a high level of celebrity and media/public interest” with the possibility for terrorists to exploit 
psychological vulnerability using only a series of threats (Cornish, 2007, p.13). However, it is 
important to note here that only six CBRN agents were identified in the current sample, and so as 
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described above in the case with radiological agents, additional data could change this 
likelihood of contamination considerably.  
As Duggan and Jones (2017) note, the use of Bayes’ Theorem will never result in a 
definitive ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer, or in this case whether a product will or will not be 
contaminated. However, using this technique during investigations can help those 
responsible for assessing threats make decisions which are informed by existing evidence. 
While the results of this study provide the first known base rates for contamination 
outcomes based on agents used or claimed to have been used, the relatively small sample 
size should not be ignored. Therefore, it is hoped that this study will serve as the foundation 
for further data collection in this area, and that the usefulness of such predictions will 
increase along with an increasing number of observations.  
Despite the low likelihood of actual contamination, there was still found to be 
roughly a 1 in 4 chance that claimed use of a biological agent, and a 1 in 3 chance that 
claimed use of a CBRN agent, would result in actual contamination. Due to the probability of 
contamination in such instances and the potential severity of outcomes should a 
contaminated item reach consumers, more attention should be paid to what other factors 
could be useful in identifying genuine cases of contamination. This is particularly important 
for other pieces of how information which could be gleaned from perpetrator 
communications, such as who the recipient of the contact is (e.g., the police, the targeted 
company, the media, etc.) or the language of the threat (e.g., whether this involves a future 
threat that ‘something will be poisoned’ or a claim that an item ‘has already been poisoned’). 
In the future, these additional elements of perpetrator communications could be used to 
create a model which incorporates multiple variables, and thus offers more predictive utility 
than the relatively simple probabilities identified in this study.  
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Consistent with the first hypothesis, considering only those cases where a vague description 
of ‘poison’ was noted, less than 10% of these cases resulted in actual contamination. In comparison 
to the claimed use of multiple different agents, which was associated with an 80% likelihood of 
contamination, this seems to suggest that fewer how details about the claimed agent (e.g., 
threatening with ‘poison’ rather than a specific agent) may be more strongly associated with 
bluffing, which is not consistent with the findings of Geurts et al. (2016). Instead, it may be that 
perpetrators who offer less detail regarding their agent choice may do so as they have not fully 
formed implementation intention around the actual act of contamination, and may instead be 
focusing on the delivery of the threat itself. However, it should be reiterated that the current study 
did not directly compare the language used by actualizers and bluffers as the content of perpetrator 
communications were not always available, and so further research would need to be conducted 
using the content of perpetrator threats before any firm conclusions could be drawn.  
It is also worth noting that the probabilities of actual contamination in this sample also 
contain some hoax cases, or instances where a product was contaminated but would not result in 
any harm to consumers (e.g., the case of plutonium in a public water supply as previously 
mentioned). Because of this, the probability of contamination here does not fully equate to the 
immediate risk of harm, but instead the ability for a perpetrator to contaminate a product. 
Therefore, when a threat is received, the language used to describe the chosen agent and the 
specific method of delivery should be carefully considered to determine whether the contamination 
threat described by the perpetrator is even feasible. For instance, it is believed that someone with 
access to an agent like S. typhi would be able to identify the bacterium by name, and would 
understand that this is the agent of contamination, rather than ‘typhoid’, which is instead the 
disease caused by this agent. In addition to using diseases as agents such as ‘typhoid’ or ‘botulism’, 
this is also pertinent in instances where the claimed agent cannot be spread through food or water 
as is the case with HIV, which was claimed to have been used in several cases in this sample during 
AGENT SELECTION AND THREAT ACTUALIZATION 
 
 
23 
 
the height of public fear and misinformation surrounding HIV transmission. Such claims may 
show a level of ignorance on the part of the perpetrator when it comes to the use of these 
agents, and would likely fail what Tunkel (2010) refers to as the ‘reality test’. This concept 
was initially applied to bomb threats without further action, with threats failing such a test 
unlikely to involve logical, actionable threats (Tunkel, 2010). Therefore, it would be helpful in 
the future not only to consider the amount of how or why detail provided, but also the 
accuracy of the actual threat described when threatening communications are available. 
This also emphasizes the importance of involving those with specific knowledge of 
chemistry, biology, or a related discipline when attempting to determine the likelihood of 
contamination threats being actualized. 
It is also worth noting that ‘threat’ and ‘actualization’ in contamination cases may 
not be distinct and opposing categories. As mentioned, threats may result in consumer fear 
and economic damage even if no product is ever contaminated. In addition, genuine 
contamination may involve different levels of seriousness, as the use of a harmless dye may 
not result in any casualties, while a small amount of household poison may be more serious, 
and the use of a chemical or biological weapon would be of the highest concern. Therefore, 
while this paper has considered actualization to be coded dichotomously as either present 
or absent, future research should focus on the scale of potential harm involved in 
contamination incidents.  
As with terrorist incidents specifically, coding event data comes with a number of 
limitations, including determining attribution (Mickolus, 2002). For instance, when 
identifying threats it can often be extremely difficult to be certain of where a threat has 
originated, as even if a group claims responsibility this does not necessarily mean that they 
are responsible. While the language of threats has been identified as important, the specific 
transcript of each threat is not available in the majority of cases when relying on open 
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source data, and so it is not possible to conduct an in-depth analysis of what was said by each 
perpetrator. Threats were also coded together when a campaign was involved, and so some of what 
was reported as having been said may have occurred across a number of different individual 
communications. This limits the ability to determine, in cases where contamination occurred, exactly 
when it occurred but also what may cause a threat to progress to actuation. Where available, it 
would be valuable in the future to examine each set of communications over time to determine how 
a trajectory to violence may materialize in such cases, especially as demands are likely to change 
over the course of an extortion attempt (Cremin, 2001). Additionally, in the cases in which there was 
direct communication (e.g., a telephone contact) it is not known what was asked of the perpetrators, 
or how this may have affected their threats or demands. However, due to the nature of the available 
data, any future study looking to examine the context of such threats would require cooperation 
from the holders of more detailed data, including law enforcement and companies which have been 
previously targeted.  
The nature of the data means that, while cases were recorded from many different countries 
worldwide, there is likely a bias towards English-speaking countries generally, and towards the US 
and UK specifically, with these countries most frequently appearing as the incident location in the 
data. As a result, there could be issues with the generalizability of these results. In addition, as data 
were collected over the span of more than 40 years, it is possible that temporal issues also have an 
effect on these results. One such example could be the fact that less than 7% of communications in 
this sample were made via the Internet, although it is acknowledged that a more recent sample 
would likely include a larger percentage of online communications. Indeed, in a sample of violent 
lone actors examined over 23 years, Gill et al. (2016) found that offenders were more likely to make 
use of the Internet in recent cases, although most offender behaviours observed in such cases were 
not found to differ significantly based on time period.  
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The use of open source data could also mean a bias in the data towards the most 
sensational cases, with more cases being included that involve particularly frightening 
agents, such as ricin, rather than, for instance, rat poison. Additionally, this could also mean 
a bias in the data towards more successful attacks, as unsuccessful attacks may be less likely 
to gain publicity in the media, due to the fact that they are generally less sensational and 
thus less newsworthy. This is consistent with previous works which have found that the 
media may underreport hoax cases (see Tishler, 2016). Other potential gaps in the data have 
been identified previously when studying contamination (Cremin, 2001; Wilson & Kilbane, 
2017), and so it is imperative that any method of data analysis used with such a sample 
allow for the inclusion of new information as it become available. Indeed, the use of Bayes’ 
Theorem means that as more information is discovered the calculated posterior probability 
becomes the prior probability for subsequent analyses (Duggan & Jones, 2017), allowing for 
more accurate predictions to be ultimately made.   
Conclusion  
While CBRN terrorist events may be an increasingly serious issue with the potential 
to cause catastrophic destruction (Mohtadi & Murshid, 2009), it still appears that such 
concerning agents are more likely to be used in empty threats as opposed to actual 
contamination incidents. However, due to the possibility of such a high number of casualties 
when one of these fear-inducing agents is used, it is crucial that more is done to separate 
authentic threats from those which will not be actualized. This should involve both the 
examination of other variables taken from threatening perpetrator communications, but 
also the close examination of the threats themselves to determine whether they are 
realistic. While these results provide a starting point for understanding the relationship 
between agent choice and likelihood of contamination, further research and additional data 
would allow for more robust predictions to be made, which could then be used by law 
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enforcement to enhance their decision making when threats are received against the supply chain.   
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Table 1 
Frequencies of different variable categories for actual contaminations and empty threats 
Variable   
category 
Variable Actual 
contamination 
(n=41) 
Empty   
threat 
(n=36) 
Totals 
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Recipient      
 Authorities  7 3 10 
 Targeted company  30 24 54 
 Media  12 6 18 
 Multiple recipients 8 2 10 
 Unreported 0 5 5 
Type of 
communication  
    
 Letter 23 24 47 
 Phone call  14 7 21 
 Online  3 2 5 
 Multiple types  7 5 12 
 Unreported  8 8 16 
Demands      
 Monetary  20 23 43 
 Non-monetary  4 2 6 
Agent      
 Chemical 29 9 38 
 Biological 5 14 19 
 Radiological 1 0 1 
 Foreign body 7 1 8 
 Multiple agents 4 1 5 
 ‘Poison’ 1 9 10 
 ‘CBRN’ 2 4 6 
Note. Agent categories are not mutually exclusive. 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Individual probabilities of Bayes’ Theorem for each type of agent claimed to have been 
used 
Agent n Pr(A) Pr(X) Pr(X|A) Pr(A|X) 
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Chemical 38 .532 .494 .707 .761 
Biological 19 .532 .247 .122 .263 
Radiological  1 .532 .013 .024 .982 
Foreign body  8 .532 .104 .171 .875 
Multiple agents 5 .532 .065 .098 .802 
‘Poison’  10 .532 .130 .024 .098 
Note. When a threatening communication is received, Pr(A) is the probability of an item being actually 
contaminated, Pr(X) is the probability that the indicated agent will be used or claimed to be used, Pr(X|A) is 
the probability that the indicated agent is used given the product in question has actually been 
contaminated, and Pr(A|X) is the probability that actual contamination will occur given the indicated agent is 
used or claimed to have been used.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Frequency of specific CBRN agents claimed to have been used 
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Agent claimed n Identification criteria 
Ricin  1 CDC Category B; CWC Schedule 1 
Escherichia coli 2 CDC Category B 
Shigella dysenteriae 1 CDC Category B 
‘Typhoid’ 1 CDC Category B 
Plutonium 1 Radiation emitting material 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Individual probabilities and descriptions for the different components of Bayes’ Theorem for CBRN 
agents 
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Component Description  n Probability 
Pr(A) Probability of an actual contamination 41 .532 
Pr(X) Probability of a CBRN agent used 6 .078 
Pr(A’) Probability of no contamination (empty threat) 36 .468 
Pr(X|A) Probability of a CBRN agent being used given an actual 
contamination 
2 .049 
Pr(X|A’) Probability of a CBRN agent being used given an empty 
threat 
4 .111 
Pr(A|X) Probability of actual contamination given the claimed 
use of a CBRN agent  
 .334 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
